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1.Introduction and Summary
Adjustments of nominal exchange rates provide a mechanism through which
the general level of prices in one country may be adjusted relative to the
general level of prices in other countries so as to neutralize the real
effects of differential monetary disturbances in different countries. Tin
contrast, the principal effect of commercial policies is on the relative
prices of goods entering into international trade and hence on the allocation
of real resources among sectors of the economy. Despite this fundamental
difference in the prime mission and basic purpose of nominal exchange rate
adjustments and commercial policies, it has long been recognized that exchange
rates can, in some circumstances, be manipulated so as to affect relative
commodity prices and thereby replicate many of the effects of commerical
policies.
In the past, three important channels have been recognized through wbLch
policies directed at affecting exchange rates can influence relative commdiuv
prices in a manner similar to that achieved by commerical policies. Firs,
systems of multiple exchange rates in which different nominal exchange retes
are applied to different categories of imports and exports are known to be
essentially equivalent to a system of import and export taxes and subsid.es.
(The standard reference on this subject is Bhagwati (1968); see also Corden
(1971, chp. L,and1967).) Second, in the presence of rigidities or
sitckyness in the nominal prices of domestic goods or of goods entering into
international trade or in the wages of factors employed in producing these
goods, movements in the nominal exchange rate, even in a unified exchange rate2
regime, clearly have the capacity to affect relative commodity prices and
influence the allocation of resources. This assumption is explicitly or
implicitly employed in many of the earlier analyses of the effects of
devaluation, including the classic contributions of Meade (1951), Harberger
(1950), Machlup (1955) and Tsiang (1961). It is also the fundamental source
of real effects of nominal exchange rate changes in more modern analyses that
assume only temporary stickyness of nominal wages or prices, such as Dornbusch
(1976and1980), Buiter and Miller (1983) and Mussa (1977, 1982a, and 1984).
Third, even with a unified exchange rate and without nominal price or wage
stickyness, government policies that affect either the distribution of
expenditure among goods or the level of spending relative to income are known
to have some capacity to affect the "real exchange rate," defined as the
relative price of one country's output in terms of another country's output.
Thisideais clearly present in the work of Meade (1951), Pearce (1961), and
Corden (1960), as well as in more modern contributions such as Dornbusch
(i'75) and the literature on the "Dutch disease."
Thepurposeof this paper is to explore in a more explicitly dynamic
ameorkthethird of these channels.In section 2, the model of the real
of the economy that is used as the basis for this exploration is
eerhed and discussed. This model is consistent both with the two—country,
twc-ccmmodity model of real trade theory (modified to allow for differences
bet:icenspendingand income in the home country) and with the "dependent
eecnomy"model.The basic equations of this model are specified in a log
linearformthat permits easier manipulation of the dynamic version of the
model in subsequent sections of the paper. In this model, as in the standard
trade theory model, there is an equilibrium value of the (logarithm of the)
relative price of domestic goods in terms of foreign goods that is consistent3
with any given value of the trade balance of the home country, for given
values of the exogenous parameters and policy variables that influence
domestic and foreign demands for domestic and foreign goods. This relative
price is identified with the concept of the "real exchange rate." It is shown
that the standard results of real trade theory apply with respect to the
comparative statics effects of various government policies on this relative
price. In particular, imposition of a tariff by the home country on imports
of foreign goods lowers the relative price of domestic goods in terms of
foreign goods in the home country. This result is taken as representative of
the effects of commercial policy on the real exchange rate.A shift of
spending by either domestic or foreign residents toward foreign goods at the
expense of domestic goods (perhaps induced by government policy) has a similar
qualitative effect on the real exchange rate. So too does a transfer of
purchasing power from home residents to foreign residents which results in a
trade balance surplus for the home country. This result reflects the
assumption that home residents have a positive marginal propensity to spend on
domestic goods while foreign residents have a zero marginal propensity to
spend on such goods.
In section 3, the model is extended to allow for endogenous determination
of differences between income and spending by domestic residents as a function
of their net asset holdings and of the domestic real interest rate. Equi-
librium in the balance of payments requires that this difference between
income and spending by domestic residents equal the current account balance
which is the trade balance determined by the real sector model of section 2
augmented by real interest income on net foreign asset holdings. This balance
of payments equilibrium condition provides the basis for a comparative statics
analysis of the effects of a variety of government policies on the realexchange rate. This comparative statics analysis, however, ignores the
dynamic repercussions of expected changes in the real exchange rate and in the
path of private net asset holdings.
In section ,thesedynamic considerations are taken into account and
solution is provided for the complete dynamic version of the model developed
in sections 2 and 3. This solution reveals that the equilibrium value of the
real exchange rate at any moment depends on expectations concerning the
exogenous factors that will influence the trade balance in all future periods
(including government commercial policies) and on expectations concerning the
exogenous factors that will influence the desired relationship between income
and spending in all future periods. For constant values of these exogenous
forcing variables, the dynamic behavior of the real exchange rate is driven by
the process of adjustment of the private stock of' net foreign assets in a
manner similar to that described by several recent models of the relationship
between the exchange rate and the current account.
In section 5, this dynamic model is applied to an analysis of government
fiscal policies. A temporary shift in government spending toward domestic
goods at the expense of government spending on foreign goods initially
appreciates the real exchange rate (raises the relative price of domestic
goods), but to a smaller extent than a permanent spending shift of the same
magnitude. This temporary spending shift also induces a temporary current
account surplus and an increase in private net asset holdings which moderate
the immediate effect of the spending shift on the real exchange rate by
spreading some of its effect into periods after the spending shift itself has
ended. A similar mechanism operates in the case of a permanent spending shift
that is expected to occur at some future date. Because private agents
anticipate the effect of this future spending shift on the real exchange rate,5
the actual real exchange rate and the level of private net asset holding react
in advance of the actual start of the spending shift. A temporary general
fiscal expansion, financed by an increase in government debt, is also shown to
appreciate the real exchange rate in the short run, even though private agents
correctly forecast the future taxes that will be necessary to pay the interest
on the expanded government debt. As with the temporary spending shift, this
temporary fiscal expansion induces a temporary increase in private net asset
holdings which assists in spreading out over time the effects of this fiscal
expansion on the real exchange rate. In the long run, the temporary fiscal
expansion depresses the real exchange rate because the higher taxes necessary
to finance the interest on the expanded government debt depress demand for
domestic goods.
In section 6, the effects of capital controls are considered. Such
controls can influence the real exchange rate by affecting the permissible
difference between spending and income and hence the level of the current
account balance. it is argued, however, that such controls have only limited
capacity to affect the long-run average level of the real exchange rate.
Theirprincipal effect is to influence the responsiveness of the real exchange
rate to various forms of economic disturbances. In general, a capital contro
that fixes the permissible value of the current account balance increases the
sensitivityof the real exchange rate to disturbances (like changes in
commercial policies) that shift spending between domestic and foreign goods,
but reduces the sensitivity of the real exchange rate to disturbances that
affect the general level of spending relative to income.
In section 7, there is an analysis of how monetary policy and nominal
exchange rate policy can interact to influence the behavior of the real
exchange rate, In the present model which assumes full flexibility of all6
nominal prices, monetary policy cannot influence the real exchange rate when
the nominal exchange rate is fully flexible. Similarly, nominal exchange rate
policy cannot influence the real exchange rate when the domestic money supply
is allowed full flexibility to adjust to official settlements surpluses and
deficits. The combination of a policy that fixes a path for the nominal money
supply and for the nominal exchange rate, however, can influence the real
exchange rate and other real variables because such a policy affects the
behavior of the real money supply. To support such a combination of monetary
policy and exchange rate policy it is generally necessary for a government to
intervene in the foreign exchange market on a sterilized basis. Such inter-
vention necessarily implies differences between government spending and
government revenue which are the fiscal effect of sterilized intervention. In
the absence of full Ricardian equivalence between debt finance and tax finance
of government expenditure, this fiscal effect to sterilized intervention
provides a channel through which the combination of monetary policy and
nominal exchange rate policy can affect the real sector of the economy and, in
ticular, the real exchange rate.
One example of such a combination of monetary and exchange rate policy is
policy that simultaneously fixes a level of the domestic money supply and
a value of the nominal exchange rate. In general, such a policy
cc'rnbination is dynamically unstable because the stock of government debt
reputred to finance official intervention in support of such a policy expands
exponcntially. This dynamic instability implies that continued belief in the
viability of such a policy combination by private economic agents is
Loc onsistent with rational expectations-—an assumption that is employed in the
dynamic model developed in section 4. To deal with this difficulty, it is
assumed that private agents foresee the possibility of a change in the nominal7
exchange rate and relate the probability of such a change and its expected
magnitude to the cumulative extent of official intervention in support of the
current nominal exchange rate. Under this assumption, it is shown thatso
long as the assessed probability of an immediate parity change remains
negligible, the real exchange rate is influenced by the combination of fixed
nominal money supply and the pegged nominal exchange rate inexactly the same
way as if private agents never foresaw any prospect of an exchange rate
change. When the cumulative extent of official intervention reaches the point
where people begin to suspect a significant probability of a paritychange in
the near future, the nature of the dynamic system is modified. The flow of
intervention required to support the existing nominal exchange ratebegins to
accelerate. The real exchange that was previously held constant by a constant
money supply and nominal exchange rate begins to rise in the case of a
prospective devaluation (or fall in the case of a prospective appreciation).
Ultimately, there is a change in the nominal exchange rate and an adjustment
of the real exchange rate to the level that is appropriate for thenew nominal
exchange rate and the size of the domestic money supply.
With slight modifications, this analysis also applies to a policy that
fixes the rate of' growth of the domestic money supply and the rate of crawl of
the nominal exchange rate, with occasional maxi—changes in the nominal
exchange rate used to correct persistent payments imbalances. The pattern of
behavior of the real exchange rate, of the current account balance, and of
other related variables under this combination of policies is reminiscent of
the experiences of some developing countries.
The paper concludes with a brief restatement of its main contribution and
a discussion of the broader range of issues to which its analytical framework
might be applied.8
2.Goods Market Equilibrium, the Trade Balance and the Real Exchange Rate
Consider a moderate size country that produces and consumes two goods: a
domestic good that is different from goods produced in the rest of the world,
and a traded good (sometimes referred to as the imported good or foreign good)
that is identical to goods produced in the rest of the world. This country
exports some of its domestic good to the rest of the world and imports some of
the traded good it consumes from the rest of the world.[n addition, this
country trades securities denominated in units of traded goods with the rest
of the world.
The country under consideration is assumed to be small with respect to
world trade in traded goods and securities, in the sense that it takes real
interest rate in the world securities market for securities denominated in
traded goods, r*, as given, independent of the flow or stock amount of the
borrowing and lending that it does to finance the difference between the value
of its exports of domestic goods and the cost of its imports of traded
goods. This country is not small, however, with respect to the market for its
domestic good. Rather, it faces a foreign demand for this good that is less
than infinitely elastic with respect to the relative price of this good in
terms of traded goods. Specifically the value of foreign excess demand for
domestic goods (measured in units of traded goods) is given by
(1) d**.q*+x*
where q* is the logarithm of the relative price of domestic goods in terms
of traded goods that faces foreign purchasers, > 0 measures the
sensitivity of foreign demand for domestic goods to variations in q*, and
x* summarizes exogenous factors affecting foreign demand for domestic9
goods.Since 1 is >0,the relative price elasticity of foreign demand
for domestic goods, n d(log(d*fl/dq* -(*/d*)-1,is negative.
Production possibilities in the home country are describedby a smooth,
convex transformation curve, with the implication that the supply of the
domestic good is an increasing function of its relativeprice, while the
supply of the traded good is a decreasing function of this relative price.
Domestic demand for the domestic good is a decreasing function of itsrelative
price, and domestic demand for the traded good is an increasing function of
this relative price. Domestic demand for each good isan increasing function
of total domestic spending. This standard specification ofsupply and demand
conditions in the home country is consistent with the followinglog-linear
specification of domestic excess demand for traded goods,f,and of the
value (in terms of traded goods) of domestic excess demand for domestic
goods, d:
(2) f —x÷ (1 —
(3) d - ÷x ÷
in these excess demand functions, q denotes the logarithm of therelative
price of domestic goods in terms of' traded goods that faces domesticpro Hrr
and consumers, >0measures the sensitivity of these excess demands to
changes in q, a and1 —aare the shares of domestic goods and traded
goods in domestic spending, iiisthe excess of domestic spending over the
value of domestic product, and x summarizes theexogenous factors affeccing
domestic excess demands for domestic and traded goods (includingtastes
production possibilities and government policies), Note that the total value
of domestic excess demand for both goods, d +f,must equal the excess of
domestic spending over the value of domestic product, iD.Notealso that10
changesin q or x,holding constant, must have offsetting effects on
d and V. Note finally that since is assumed positive, the relative
price elasticity of domestic demand for imports of traded goods, n-
isnegativeS
The relative price of domestic goods confronting domestic residents
differs from the relative price confronting foreign residents when the
government of the home country imposes an ad valorem tariff on imports of
traded goods or, equivalently, an ad valorem export tax on exports of domestic
goods. Formally the effects of such commercial policies indicated by the
relationship,
zq--r
here -risthe logarithm of one plus the ad valorem tax rate on either
trnportsoftraded goods or exports of domestic goods.
Withthiscommercial policy in force, the condition for equilibrium in
rLe marketfordomestic goods which must be satisfied at every moment of time
ozp'essedbythe requirement that
0dd* z—- )q+(x+x*T)+ a,.
rtr, atevery moment of time, the trade balance of the home country is the
oes ofthevalue of home exports of domestic goods, d*, over the value of
rome imports of traded goods; that is,
T —( +s*).q+(x+x**T)—(1
—
Jring(i)and(6),wearrive at the conclusion that
T (z —q)z—11
where v (+*)/a and z(x + x + *T)/( + *).Thisresult
expresses the equivalence between the absorption and elasticities approaches
to analysis of the trade balance. In accord with the elasticitiesapproach,
the trade balance depends on the terms of trade (representedby q) through
the relationship Tv.(z -q).In accord with the absorption approach, the
trade balance equals the excess of the value of domestic product over domestic
expenditure; i.e., T—p.
It is worthwhile emphasizing that this result concerning the trade
balance and the equations that underlie it are consistent with several
possible specifications of the production structure of the economy. One
specification is that of the standard two-country, two-commodity model of the
pure theory of international trade (summarized, for instance, by Mundell
(1968, chps. 1-3)). In this specification, both the domestic good and the
foreign good are produced (as well as consumed) in the home country, and the
domestic good is distinguished only by the fact that it is exportedby the
home country. Another specification that is more commonly used in two-country
macroeconomic models (see Mussa (1979) and the references cited therein) is
that the home country produces only its domestic good and the rest of the
world produces only the foreign good. A third specification is that of the
udependent economy7' model developed by Salter(1959) and Swan (1960) and widely
applied in both trade theory and open economy macroeconomics.In this
specification, the domestic good is a nontraded good that is produced and
consumed exclusively within the home country (d* therefore is equal to zero),
while the foreign good is an internationally traded good that is produced and
consumed in the home country and may be either imported or exported depending
on whether the home country has a trade deficit or a trade surplus. All of
the analysis in this paper is consistent with any one of these three12
specifications of production structure, though the interpretation of some
results depends on the particular specification that one has in mind.
The standard results of the real theory of international trade concerning
the effects import tariffs or export taxes and transfers paid to residents of
the home country (usually derived in the standard two—country, two-commodity
model) are obtained by applying implicitly differentiation to (7) and
evaluating the results where T0:
(8) dq/dT —*/(B+*);dq*/dT /( ÷
(9) dq/d(—)dq*/d(_)o/( +
Thepositive value of the denominator in (8) and (9),÷ , reflectsthe
fact that the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied; that is, the sum of' the
import demand elasticities plus one in negative,
(10) r + + 1=(—s/f)+((.*/d*)—1)+1—( +*)/f< 0.
Equation (8) expresses the standard result that a tariff on imports of traded
goods imported into the home country reduces the home relative price of
domestic goods (increase the home relative price of traded goods) and
increases the foreign relative price of domestic goods.(See, for example,
Mundell 1968, chp. 3.) Equation (9) says that a transfer received by
residents of the home country (which allows an excess of domestic spending
over domestic income, represented by a positive value of -) pushes up the
relative price of domestic goods. This positive effect of a transfer received
(and spent) by domestic residents on the relative price of domestic goods
reflects a determinate sign of the transfer problem criterion (see again
Mundell 1968, chp, 2) that arises because the marginal propensity of domestic
residents to spend on domestic goods is positive, while the marginal13
propensity of foreign residents (who pay the transfer) to spend on domestic
goods is zero.
For the purposes of the present discussion, (8)isa key result that
summarizes the essential mechanism through which commercial policy works its
effects on the economy. Specifically, changes in commercial policy,
represented by changes in T,affectthe relative price of domestic goods and
thereby affect all of the production and consumption decisions that are
influenced by this relative price. Defining the relative price of domestic
goods as "the real exchange rate,'t it follows that other policies can
replicate the effects of commercial policy to the extent that they have
similar effects on the real exchange rate.
There are two general mechanisms through which economic policiesmay have
such effects on the real exchange rate. First, economic policies can affect
the exogenous shift variable x that appears in the domestic excess demand
functions and perhaps also the exogenous shift variable x thatappears in
the foreign excess demand function for domestic goods. Formally, the effects
of changes in x and x on q are obtained by implicit differentiation of
the trade balance equilibrium condition, T z(z-q) 0;
(11) dq/dxdq*/dx1/( + dq/dx'dq/dx*i/( +
Forexample, a shift of domestic government spending away from domestic goods
and toward domestically produced traded goods induces a decrease in x and
implies a decrease in q that is similar to that induced by an increase 1n
the tariff rate. Alternatively, a tax-financed increase in domestic
government spending directed toward traded goods induces a decrease in x
because the reduction in private sector spending due to the tax increase is
spread over both domestic and traded goods. Second, as indicated by (9),14
economicpolicies can affect the real exchange rate by affecting the
difference between domestic spending and domestic income. Specifically, any
policy that reduces domestic spending relative to domestic income (holding
x, s and t constant) will reduce q and replicate the effects of an
increase in the tariff rate on imports of traded goods. Further investigation
of this mechanism through which economic policies can affect the real exchange
rate and thereby replicate many of the effects of commercial policy is the
principal subject of this paper.
3.Balanceof Payments Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
In order to analyze policies that affect the real exchange rate by
influencing the difference between spending and income, it is necessary to
specify the determinants of differences between spending and income and to
describe the condition of balance of payments equilibrium. This equilibrium
condition may then be employed to provide an initial comparative statics
analysis of effects of a variety of policies on the real exchange rate.
Suppose that the desired excess of private spending over private income
for the country under consideration is given by
(12) h —cr+ u
where h measures the excess of spending over income in terms of traded
goods, A is the net stock of privately held assets denominated in traded
goods, r is the real rate of return that domestic residents expect to earn
on their net asset holdings, u summarizes exogenous factors affecting h
(including some government policies), and > 0 and a > 0 are parameters
indicating the responsiveness of h to variations in A and r, Since
privately issued securities net out against privately held securities, net
private securities holdings must consist of securities issued by foreigners15
(or debts owed to foreigners if A is < 0) or holdings of bonds issued by the
domestic government. Since real interest income earned on private net asset
holdings is included in private sector income, the positive value of the
parameter implies that an increase in A increases desired private
spending by more than it increases private income. Further, since excesses of
private spending over private income must be financed at the expense of
private net asset holdings, it follows that
(13) D(A)—h
where D(A(t)) A(t +1)—A(t)is the forward difference in the level of A.
The excess of spending over income for the home country includes the
excess of government spending over government revenue, g,as well as the
excess of private spending over private income, h. Government spending
includes the real interest that the government must pay on its outstanding
stock of government debt, G. The excess of government spending over
government revenue is financed by issuing (or retiring) government debt,
(1)4) 0(G) g.
The net asset position of the home country as a whole, 'J,is equal to the
excess of privately held net assets over the outstanding stock of government
debt,
(15) A —G.
The change in this net asset position corresponds to the total excess of
income over spending,
(16) 0(N) —(h+g)16
The desired change in net assets implied by (16) may be thought of as the
desired capital outflow of the home country. In order for the economic system
to be in equilibrium, this desired capital outflow must correspond to the
current account balance which is the sum of the trade balance and the service
account balance. The trade balance is given by (7) as Tv•(z -q).The
service account balance is the real interest income that the home country
earns on its net asset position, which is equal to the real interest rate
prevailing in the world securities market, r*, multiplied by t'J A —G.
Substituting (12) into (16), it follows that the critical requirement for
momentary equilibrium in the economic system may be expressed as the balance
of payments equilibrium condition,
(17) 'J•(z -q)+r*.(A—G)•r — — u—g.
In this condition, the expected real rate of return on private asset holdings
is not identified with r* because some government policies induce diver—
gences between r and r* and because expected changes in the relative price
of domestic goods also imply such divergences.
Preliminary conclusions concerning the capacity of various policies to
replicate the effects of commercial policy by influencing the real exchange
rate may be obtained by applying implicit differentiation to the balance of
payments equilibrium condition (17). These conclusions are only preliminary
because they neglect dynamic effects arising from induced changes in asset
stocks and from changes in anticipations of future policies that are examined
in later sections. Many of the conclusions of the present analysis, however,
do apply (under appropriate assumptions and specifications) to the long run
effects of permanent changes in government policies when account is taken of
these dynamic complications.17
First, consider an increase in the outstanding stock of government
debt. Holding z,A,r,u and g constant, the change in q necessary
to maintain balance of payments equilibrium in the face of an increase in G
is given by
(18) dq/DG —r*/ or*/( +
Theexplanation of this result is that a larger stock of government debt
requires a higher flow of net interest payments to foreigners who must be the
holders of this debt if net assets of the private sector are constant. Witha
constant desired capital outflow (or inflow), this increase in net interest
payments requires an improvement in the trade balance which, in turn, requires
a lower relative price of domestic goods. This conclusion, it should be
emphasized, does not depend on the assumption that the increased taxes
necessary to finance the interest on the expanded government debt are ignored
by the private sector. Since g is defined as the excess of government
spending (including interest payments on government debt) over government
revenue and gis held constant, the implicit assumption is that taxes are
raised sufficiently to pay the increased interest on the expandedgovernment
debt. Private sector income falls by the amount of this increase in taxes.
Since h is the excess of private sector spending over private sector income
and h is held constant in the derivation of (18), it follows that this
result embodies the assumption that private sector spending falls by the
amount of increased taxes necessary to finance interest payments on the
expanded government debt. Indeed, the decline in the relative price of
domestic goods in response to an increase in the outstanding stock of
government debt is precisely the appropriate relative price response to a
transfer of spending from domestic residents who have a positive marginal18
propensity to spend on domestic goods to foreign residents (the recipients of
the interest paid on the net government debt) who have a zero marginal
propensity to spend on domestic goods.
An implicit assumption that is essential to (18) is the assumption that
government debt is not viewed as a liability by the private sector in the
sense that the stock of such debt exerts a negative effect on the desired
excess of private spending over private income that is equivalent to the
positive effect, p•A, exerted by privately held net assets. This is
consistent with the notion of Metzler (1951) and Mundell (1960) that
marketable assets exert a positive effect on desired spending beyond the
effect of their yield on income, but that future tax liabilities associated
with government debt are not regarded as marketable liabilities that offset
this effect of marketable assets. (An alternative approach to eliminating
Ricardian equivalence between debt and tax finance of government expenditures
is to assume an overlapping generations model with no bequest motive. For a
recent and elegant version of such a model, see Blanchard (19811); see Frenkel
and Razin (19811) for an application of this model in a open economy
context.) Were this not the case, then a term -•Gwould have to be
included among the factors affecting the desired excess of private spending
over private income so that (12) would become
(12') hi•(A —C)-a'r+u.
This modification would add a term iG to the right hand side of the balance
of payments equilibrium condition (17) and would modify the result (18) to
(18')dq/dG —(r*+19
This result, however, would not represent the long run equilibrium effect of
an increase in the stock of government debt because with (12') an increase
in G implies a reduction in h and hence an increase in the rate of
accumulation of privately held net assets. The long run cumulative effect of
this change in private asset accumulation is that privately held net assets
would rise by exactly the amount of the increase in the stock of government
debt. In the long run, therefore, there would be no reduction in domestic
spending and increase in foreign spending because increased interest and
associated taxes on the expanded government debt would be exactly offset by
the increased interest received on privately held net assets. Under these
conditions, therefore, an increase in the stock of government debt would have
no long run effect on the relative price of domestic goods. (In Barro's
(197J4) terminology, there would be no long run net wealth effect from changes
in the stock of' government debt because they would be fully offset by changes
in private security holdings.)
Second, consider a temporary reduction in the general level of
taxation. The short run effect of this policy is a temporary increase in
government expenditure relative to government revenue, that is, a temporary
increase in g. Maintenance of balance of payments equilibrium in the face of
this increase in g, with given values of z,A, G,r and U, requires
an increase in the relative price of domestic goods;
(19) dq/dg z1/uo/( ÷
This result embodies the assumption that the private sector does not forecast
the future tax liability implicit in flow of government debt which finances
the current tax reduction. Of consequence, the excess of private spending
over private income does not decline in response to the increase in government20
expenditure relative to government revenue; rather private spending rises to
the extent of the tax reduction. This increase in private spending falls
partly on domestic goods and forces an increase in the relative price of these
goods to maintain equilibrium in the domestic goods market. Over time, the
temporary reduction in taxes enlarges the stock of government debt and (under
the assumptions of the present analysis) this increase in the stock of
government debt tends to offset the direct effect of the tax reduction in
reducing q. Ultimately, when taxes are raised sufficiently to eliminate the
government deficit, the long run effect of the temporary tax reduction is to
raise the long run stock of government debt and the long run level of' taxes
required to finance the interest on this debt. The long run effect of the
temporary tax reduction (under the assumptions of the present analysis),
therefore, is to reduce the long run equilibrium value of the real exchange
rate for precisely the reasons discussed in connection with the effects of an
increase in the outstanding stock of government debt.
Third, consider a policy that permanently raises the expected real rate
of' return for private asset holders. Such a policy might be a permanent
reduction in the tax rate on interest income. At given values of A, G,
g, u and z, an increase in r reduces the desired excess of private
spending over private income and requires a reduction in q in order to
maintain balance of payments equilibrium;
(20) dq/dr -
Overtime, however, the reduction in h implied by an increase in r
generates a higher net stock of private held assets, and the effect of an
increase in A on the relative price of domestic goods is given by
(21) dq/dA (i+21
The cumulative change in A necessary to offset the increase in r and
return h to the zero value consistent with no further changes in A is
given by AA(a/w)Ar where iXris the policy induced change in r.It is
easily shown that the combined long run effect of the increase in r and the
induced increase in A on the relative price of domestic goods is given by
(22) (-c&/v)Ar +((ii ÷ r*)/v).AA(r*/).AA(cxr*/).Ar.
The reason for this increase in the long run equilibrium value of q in
reponse to a policy induced increase in r is that the long run level of
income of domestic residents rises due to the increase in A and domestic
residents spend a fraction of this increased income on domestic goods, thereby
forcing an increase in their relative price. This example points to the
importance of distinguishing between short run and long run effects when
considering the consequences of government policies that affect the real
exchange rate.
Lt.A Dynamic Model of the Real Exchange Rate
In order to provide a complete, dynamic analysis of government policies
that affect the real exchange rate, it is necessary to take account of
endogenously determined changes in the net stock of privately held assets that
occur as the counterpart of current account imbalances and also to take
account of the influence of expected changes in relative price of domestic
goods on economic behavior. To provide a benchmark for dynamic analysis of
the effects of government policies, it is useful first to examine the dynamic
interactions among the real exchange rate, the net stock of privately held
assets and the current account balance in the absence of any government
interventions. For this purpose, it is assumed that the stock of government22
debt is constant at zero and that government expenditure and government
revenue are also zero.
Since no tax is imposed on private security holdings, the interest rate
earned on such holdings is the real interest rate r* that prevails in the
world securities market. The real rate of return that influences private
spending and saving decisions, r, however, is equal to r* only when no
capital gains or losses are anticipated on private security holdings. More
generally, the expected real rate of return for private security holders is
given by
(23) r r* -a.De(q)
where De(q) denotes the expected rate of change of the relative price of
domestic goods. The rationale for this relationship is that the real yield
relevant for the spending and saving decisions of domestic residents is
measured relative to a consumption basket that contains both domestic and
traded goods. This real yield on a security with a fixed price and fixed
interest rate in terms of traded goods is less than r* to the extent of the
expected rate of increase of the relative price of domestic goods, multiplied
by the share of domestic goods in the consumption basket. This assumption
concerning the domestic real interest rate is a common feature of models that
allow for changes in the real exchange rate; in particular, see Dornbusch
(1983), Mussa (1982a and 1984), and Obstfeld (1981 and 1983).
This specification of the domestic real interest rate together with the
assumptions that G0 and g0 imply that the balance of payments
equilibrium condition (17) can be written as
e
(224) '.(z —q)+rA w —cxoD (q)—23
where w cz.r* -usummarizes all of the exogenous factors (including the
world real interest rate) that influence the desired excess of private income
over private spending. Equation (26) is a dynamic equation because it
involves the expected rate of change of the relative price of domestic goods
and because it involves the net stock of privately held assets which is
changing whenever private income differs from private spending, specifically,
(25) D(A) -hw -a.De(q)
Under the assumption of rationality of expectations, equations (24) and
(25) constitute a dynamic system that constrains the expected evolution of the
relative price of domestic goods and the net stock of privately held assets,
conditional on the information available at a given date. In matrix form,
this dynamic system may be written as






Theeconomically appropriate solution of this dynamic system yields the
following expression for the current expected equilibrium value or the real
exchange rate, qe(t)E(q(t); t):
(27) qe(t)(t) +(Ae()-
where(t) is the current expected long run equilibrium value of the real
exchange rate, Ae(t)E(A(t); t)is the current expected level of net
private asset holdings, ,isthe current expected long run equilibrium
level of net private asset holdings, and y > 0 is a parameter that24
determines the responsiveness of qe(t) to deviations between Ae(t) and
(t). The values of (t), (t) and y are determined by
(28) (t) z(t)+(r*/v).(t)
(29) (t) (1 -o)8E(z(t+j);t)
j0
(30) (t) (1 -8)z e•E(w(t +j)/;t)
j0
(31) y (X/v) —(1/ac)
where the discount factor einvolved in the definitions of A(t) and (t)
is given by
(32) e 1/(1 +X)
and where Xis the positive characteristic root associated with the dynamic
(91Y ..j.—"-,'—." \'-,, ,
(33) x(1/2).{(r* +(/aa))+/r*+(/aa))2+
Theresults (28) through (33) may be interpreted as follows. (For
further discussion, see Mussa (1984).) Equation (16) says that the current
expected long run equilibrium real exchange rate, (t), is the real exchange
rate expected to make the present discounted value (using the discount factor
0) of trade imbalances equal to zero, namely a(t) as defined by (29),
adjusted for the effect of expected net interest income on the current
expected long run equilibrium level of privately held net assets, Pccording
to (30), this expected long run equilibrium level of privately held net assets25
is the expected present discounted value (using the discount factor e)of
the exogenous factors affecting the desired excess of private spending over
private income, divided by the sensitivity of this excess of private income
over private spending to the actual level of privately held net assets.
Equation (31) defines the reduced form parameter y that appears in (27) in
terms of the more basic parameters that appear in the balance of payments
equilibrium condition (24). Using (33),itis easily established that
yis>r*/vwhich is necessarily positive. Equation (32) indicates that
the positive characteristic root X plays the role of "the discount rate" in
the expressions that define (t) and (t). Equation (33)relatesthe value
of this discount rate to the parameters that appear in the balance of payments
equilibrium condition (24).
Because no restriction has been placed on the expected behavior of'the
exogeous factors affecting the trade balance (the z's) or on the exogenous
factors affecting the desired excess of private income over private spending
(the w's), these results provide a description of the determinants of the
current expected equilibrium real exchange rate under a wide variety of
possible assumptions about how economic conditions are expected to change over
time. This generality has a cost in terms of increased complexity of the
required analysis. It also has important benefits in terms of a capacity to
analyze expected changes in government policies and other exogenous variables,
to deal with a variety of notions of permanent and transitory changes in
government policies and other exogenous variables, and to distinguish between
the expected effects of expected changes in these exogenous variables and the
unexpected effects attributable to new information about present and future
government policies and other exogenous disturbances,26
When the exogenous factors affecting the trade balance and the desired
excess of private spending are known to have constant values (say z(s)
for all s and w(s) for all s), the dynamic process governing the
expected evolution of the real exchange rate and the net stock of privately
held assets can be described quite simply. Since there is no good reason to
distinguish between expected and actual values of q and A when the z's
and w's are equal to known constants, this description applies equally well
to the actual evolution of q and A, and is illustrated in those terms in
figure 1. The dynamic process that is described. in this figure embodies the
essential features of a number of recent analyses of the dynamic interactions
among the current account balance, the level of net foreign assets, and the
real exchange rate, in particular, those of Kouri (1976), Calvo and Rodriquez
(1977), Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) and Obstfeld (1981a).
Suppose that the initial net level of privately held assets, A(0), is
greater than the long run equilibrium level, A z w/1i.Then,as illustrated
in panel a, the initial equilibrium real exchange rate, q(0) +
— ), mustbe above the long run equilibrium real exchange rate,
+(r*/v)..As illustrated in panel b, this initial real exchange
implies an initial current account deficit, b(0) v( —q(0))i-
r*.A(O)= (vy —r*).(—A(0))< 0. This current account deficit implies a
decline in the net stock of privately held assets between period 0 and period
1, D(A(0)) = b(0) = (y —r*).(A—A(0))<0.This decline in net assets
implies that real exchange rate in period 1,q(1) +y(A(1)—), as
determined in panel a, must be below its previous value but still above its
long run equilibrium value. The fact that this decline in the real exchange
rate, D(q(0)) y•D(A(0))y.b(0), was anticipated in period 0 implies that































































































































































































































have been above its long run equilibrium value, r*. In period 1, this
process repeats, starting with a net stock of privately held assets A(1)
that is between A(O) and .Overtime, the net stock of privately held
assets, the real exchange rate and the domestic real interest rate all
gradually decline toward their respective long run equilibrium values, and the
current account deficit is gradually eliminated.
The dynamic process illustrated in figure 1 is the process of convergence
of the economic system toward the fixed long run equilibrium position deter-.
mined by known constant values of the exogenous forcing variables z and
w. The essential driving force in this adjustment process is the gradual
adjustment of the net stock of privately held assets toward its long run
equilibrium level. There are limited circumstances in which this single
element of a more complex dynamic system provides an essentially complete
description of the dynamic response of the economic system to some change in
economic conditions. In particular, consider a permanent (constant) increase
in the tariff rate applied to imports of traded goods, T >0.Such a tariff
increase reduces the value of the exogenous forcing variable affecting the
trade balance, z z x + x -8*T,by a known constant amount This
implies that the real exchange rate consistent with long run equilibrium in
the trade balance, ,fallsby an amount Assuming that the tariff
increase does not affect the exogenous factor that influences the desired
excess of private spending over private income, it follows that there is no
change in /ji and hence that the real exchange rate consistent with long
run equilibrium in the current account, ,fallsby the same amount as
In terms of figure 1, this means that the schedule showing q(t) as a
function of A(t) in panel a and the schedule showing b(t) as a function
of q(t) in panel b both shift downwards to the extent of the reduction in28
and .Whateverthe net stock of privately held assets at the time of the
permanent tariff increase, therefore, the immediate effect of the tariff'
increase is to reduce q(t) by the same amount as the reductions in tand
.Dependingon whether A(t) is greater or less than A, q will
subsequently fall or rise toward its new long run equilibrium value as A
converges to .Ateach moment, q will be below the value it would have
had in the absence of the tariff increase by precisely the amount that
measures the long run equilibrium effect of the tariff increase.
The dynamic system (26) and its solution given by (28) through (33) may
also be used to analyze changes in the tariff rate that are expected to be
temporary or permanent changes that are expected to occur at some future
date. Such commercial policy changes imply either a temporary change in the
level of the forcing varible z during some finite interval or a permanent
change in the level of z that occurs at some specific future date. Such
commercial policy changes may also imply changes in the exogenous forcing
variable w which takes account of the desired spending and saving behavior
of the private sector. The reason why w may be affected is that temporary
changes in commercial policy or changes that are expected to occur at a future
date affect the expected time path of the real exchange rate and hence private
incentives for spending and saving. This is a point that has recently been
emphasized by Razin and Svennsson (1983) (see also Svennsson and Razin (1983))
and is represented formally in the present model by allowing for changes in
the path of w as well as in the path of z. Given the prescribed changes in
the paths of these exogenous forcing variables, the general solution of the
model provides a description of how the real exchange rate responds to
temporary or future expected changes in commercial policy.29
5. Fiscal Policy and the Real Exchange Rate
The dynamic model of section 4 may be applied immediately to analyze the
effect on the real exchange rate of shifts of government spending between
domestic and foreign goods. Going back to section 2, an increase in govern-
ment spending on domestic goods at the expense of government spending on
foreign goods is represented by an increase in the exogenous factor x that
enters positively into the value of excess demand for domestic goods and
negatively into the excess demand for foreign goods. In the dynamic model of
section 4, such an increase in x translates into a corresponding increase in
the exogneous forcing variable z.It follows that an unexpected permanent
shift in government spending away from foreign goods and toward domestic
goods, Ax > 0, will increase the equilibrium real exchange rate given by
(27) by a constant amount Aq(a/)ix at every moment of time, relative to
the value it would have had in the absence of this government spending
shift. This, of course, is the same result that was obtained in the initial
comparative statics analysis of a government spending shift described in
section 2.
The virtue of the dynamic model of section 4 is that it permits analysis
of any more complicated shift in the actual or expected distribution of
Eovernment spending between domestic and foreign goods. In particular,
consider an unexpected shift of government spending toward domestic goods Ax
at time t that is expected to last only T periods. The impact effect of
this unexpected temporary spending shift on the real exchange rate in period
tisAq(t)(o/u).Ax(1 -8T)which is smaller than the effect of a
permanent spending shift of the same magnitude. As the period of termination
of the spending shift approaches, the effect of the shift on the real exchange
rate consistent with long—run trade balance equilibrium diminishes, with30
(s) (o/v).x.(1BT+t_5) for t < s < T +t.The effect on ,
however,is not the only effect of'thetemporary spending shift on the real
exchange rate. In addition, because private agents know that the spending
shift is temporary, they anticipate that q will change in period t +T
when the temporary spending shifts ends. This anticipated change in q
affects the expected real interest rate for domestic residents who consume
both domestic and foreign goods and thereby affects their spending and savings
behavior. Between period t and period t ÷T,domestic residents expect
future declines in q and therefore save more than would otherwise be the
case. This implies that the private net stock of foreign assets, A(s),
rises above the level it would otherwise have for t < s < t +T.It follows
that tq(s) is> (s) for t < s K t ÷T.Moreover, since A(t ÷T)is
greater than the value it would have in the absence of the temporary spending
shift, it follows that q(s) remains somewhat above the level it would have
in the absence of the temporary spending shift for s ￿ T +t,and only
gradually converges back toward its previous path as the increase in A built
up between t and t ÷Tis gradually run down.
another application of the dynamic model of section 14 is to the analysis
of a shift in government spending that is expected to occur at date s
t +Tthat lies T periods in the future. Suppose that private agents first
learn of this spending shift in period t and that they expect it will be
permanent once it starts in period t +T.Even though this expected future
spending shift has no immediate direct effect on excess demands for domestic
and foreign goods, it does have an immediate effect on the real exchange rate
equal to q(t) (a/4Ax8T where Ax is the size of the permanent
spending shift that is expected to occur at t ÷T.The source of this change
in q(t) is the change in the real exchange rate anticipated to be consistent31
with long run equilibrium in the trade balance, A(t). As time progresses
between t andt. +T,the real exchange rate is also affected by induced
changes in private net asset holdings which are reduced relative to their
previously expected path because private agents anticipate increases in q as
the moment of the spending shift approaches. The decrease in A(t +T)
relative to the level it would have had in the absence of anticipations of the
spending shift implies that q(t +T)as determined by (27) is below the
level it would have if the spending shift suddenly became known at T ÷t.
Thus, the effect of spending shift being anticipated in period t, rather
than becoming known in period t +T,is that the adjustment of the real
exchange rate to this spending shift is spread out over time, rather than
occuring all at once in period t +T.Some of the adjustment of q occurs
immediately when the spending shift is first anticipated in period t. Some
more adjustment q takes place between t and t +T.Some adjustment takes
place after t ÷Tas private net asset holdings are raised back to the path
they would have followed in the absence of anticipations of the spending
shift.
With slight modification, the dynamic model of sectionmay also be used
to analyze the effects on the real exchange rate of general fiscal policy,
defined as variations in the debt-financed difference between government
expenditure and government revenue, g. To deal with general fiscal policy,
the balance of payments equilibrium condition must be modified from (24) to
e
(34) 'J•(zq) +r•(A —G)w —ca'D (q)—jA—g
where G is the stock of government debt and g is the excess of government
spending (including interest payments on outstanding debt) over government
revenue, With this modification, the dynamic system determining the expected32
future evolution of q and A is given by





The only difference between this dynamic system and the dynamic system (26) is
that the exogenous forcing variable in the top equation is now w - -
g+r*.G,whereas before it was simply wu-z. The additional term
r*.G -gin this forcing variable takes account of the effects of general
fiscal policy. The solution of the dynamic system (35) is the same as the
solution of the dynamic system (26), as given by (27) through (33), except
that the expression for the real exchange rate consistent with long run
equilibrium in the trade balance, (t), given by (29) must be modified by
replacing the forcing variable z(t +j)with y(t +j) z(t ÷j)+
(1/)(g(t÷j)-r.G(t÷jfl.
With this modification in mind, consider an unexpected temporary fiscal
expansion in which lump sum taxes are cut by a constant amount for T
periods, starting in the current period t, without any tax increases to
finance the increased interest paynments on the expanding government debt
until period t +T,when taxes are raised sufficiently to eliminate the
deficit. This policy translates into a constant unexpected increase y(s)
for t ￿ s < t +T,and a constant unexpected decrease in y(s) for
s ￿ t +Tequal to the interest on the increase in the government debt
between t and t +T.The impact effect of this fiscal policy on the real
exchange rate at time t is given by
(36) q(t) (t) (1 -e)[1 9T.(1 +r*)T].(K/)> 0,
+33
where AK > 0 is the amount of the reduction in lump sum taxes (relative to
their previously expected path) between t and t +T.This impact effect on
the real exchange rate is positive because the discount rate X used in
calculating (t), as given by (33), is larger than r* and therefore
implies that 0T.(1 +r*)T [(1 +r*)/(1+x)]Tis less than 1.As time
progresses, the size of the increase in (s) for t < s < t ÷Tdiminishes
and ultimately turns negative because the number of future periods in which
taxes will be lower is diminishing and the date at which taxes will be raised
to cover the deficit is approahing. After time t +T,(s) is reduced
permanently by an amount (AK/)[(1 ÷r*)T-1]which represents the long run
equilibrium effect on of the increased taxes that are imposed to finance
the increased interest on the expanded stock of government debt.
Except in period t, the response of q(s) to the fiscal policy does
not mirror exactly the response of (s) because the expectations of changes
in q induced by the policy influence private savings behavior and hence the
path of the private net stock of foreign assets. Specifically, since qis
expected to decline subsequent to its initial upward jump in period t,
A(s) rises above its level in the absence of the fiscal policy for t K s K
t ÷Tand gradually falls back to its previous path for s ￿ t ÷T.In
accord with (27), this increase in A(s) relative to its previous path
results in an increase in q(s) relative to (s). The overall result, as
illustrated in figure 2, is that during the interval between t and t +T,
Aq(s) remains positive even after A(s) has become negative. By period
t +T,Aq(s) is negative, but smaller in absolute value than A(s). Only
as the increased net stock of private asset holdings built up between t







Fig.—-2 TheEffects of a TemporaryFiscal Expansion on the Real Exchange
Rate and on Private Net Holdings of Foreign Assets.3L
This analysis of the effects of general fiscal policy can be extended to
other examples embodying alternative specifications of the paths of g and
G and hence of the exogenous forcing variable yz ÷(1/v)(g-r*.G).
Rather than pursuing such examples, however, it is more useful to investigate
the elements of the specification of the present model that allow general
fiscal policy to influence the behavior of the real exchange rate.
The short run effect of expansionary fiscal policy in raising the real
exchange rate does not rely on the failure of private agents to forecast
future tax liabilities correctly or on the failure of the government to impose
taxes sufficient to pay the interest on the government debt, but does depend
on the absence of full Ricardian equivalence between debt-financed and tax—
financed government spending. In the example just considered (as should be
the case in any well specified example of fiscal policy), the government's
intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied because the government ultimately
(starting in period t +T)raises taxes sufficiently to pay the interest on
the expanded stock of government debt. Private agents foresee this tax
increase starting in period t when the policy is introduced, and the
reaction of the real exchange rate to the new policy, as given by (36),
reflects the anticipation of these future taxes. The effect of the
anticipated increase in future taxes reduces but does not eliminate the
expansionary effect of the government deficit because the discount rate X
that is applied to determine the effect of future taxes on the current real
exchange rate is greater than the interest rate r* on government debt. If
private saving responded immediately to the government deficit, in the manner
required to maintain Ricardian equivalence between debt and tax finance of
government spending, there would be no such expansionary effect of fiscal
policy. In this case, the exogenous variable u which takes account of35
exogenous factors affecting the desired excess of private income over private
spending would rise immediately to offset any increase in g and leave no
room for government deficits to affect the aggregate level of desired
spending. The present analysis which excludes such an offset effect of
private saving implicitly assumes that general fiscal policy operates in the
same way as shifts in the desired intertemporal distribution of private
spending. This would be an entirely appropriate assumption, even under the
conditions of Ricardian equivalence, if the government always acted in the
interests of private agents, with its budget deficits and surpluses reflecting
private preferences with respect to the intertemporal distribution of spending
relative to income.
6.CapitalControls and the Real Exchange Rate
In the preceding analysis of the behavior of the real exchange rate, it
has been assumed that private agents can borrow or lend whatever amount they
want (denominated in terms of foreign goods> in the world capital market at
the prevailing real interest rate r*. Capital controls are a policy by which
a government may limit the extent of such private credit flows and thereby
influence the behavior of the real exchange rate. Specifically, looking back
at the expression for the trade balance given in equation (7), T
—q) -ip,itfollows that any policy that affects -p(the excess of
domestic income over the value of domestic output> by controlling inter-
national capital flows must, for a given value of z, affect the level ofq.
Formally, there are a variety of ways in which capital controls might be
introduced into the model used to determine the behavior of the real exchange
rate. By far the simplest is to specify that the internatioriai flow of net
private capital (the change in the net private stock for foreign securities)
is controlled directly each period by the government. The policy determined36
net outflow of capital (i.e., the increase in private net holdings of foreign
assets) in period t is denoted by a(t). Returning to the base case
assumptions that government revenue is equal to government expenditure
(g0) and that there is no outstanding government debt (G0), the
condition for balance of payments equilibrium in the presence of capital
controls is expressed by the requirement that
(37) v(z(t) -q(t))+r*.A(t) a(t).
Solving this condition for q(t),it follows that the (logarithm of the) real
exchange rate is given by
(38) q(t) z(t) +(i/v)[r*.A(t)a(t)}.
It is apparent that a higher permissible capital outflow or lower permissible
capital inflow in the current period (i.e. a lower value of a(t)) implies a
lower current real exchange rate (a lower value of q(t)). However, since
greater current capital outflows or smaller current capital inflows mean
larger future private net holdings of foreign assets (i.e., higher future
values of A(s) for s > t), a higher current value of a(t) implies lower
future values of q(s) for s > t.
In considering the effects of capital controls on the real exchange rate,
it is useful to distinguish between persistent effects on the level of the
real exchange rate and effects on the variability of the real exchange rate in
response to different types of economic disturbances. The capacity of capital
controls to maintain a long run average value of the real exchange rate
different from the long run average that would prevail in the absence of such
controls is limited to the ability of such controls to maintain a long run
average value of A that differs from its long run equilibrium value in the37
absence of controls. Specifically, comparing the long-run average value of
q determined by (38) (denoted by qfor the average with controls) with the
long-run average value of q determined by (27) (denoted by qfor the
average with no control), under the assumption that the processes generating
the z's and the w's are stationary, we find that
(39) q —q (r*/)[A —A
c n c n
where Aand Aare the long-run average values of'A with and without
c n
controls. This result reflects the fact that interest income earned on
private net foreign asset holdings is spent partly on domestic goods, thereby
implying that a higher long-run average level of private net foreign asset
holdings requires a higher long—run average level of q to maintain
equilibrium in the market for domestic goods. For relevant sizes of the
parameters r* and ,itis apparent that in order for capital controls to
have a substantial long-run effect on the average value of the real exchange
rate, they must have a large effect on the long-run average level of private
net holdings of foreign assets.
ifl contrast to their limited capacity to affect the long-run average
level of the real exchange rate, capital controls can substantially affect the
responsiveness of the real exchange rate to temporary disturbances, Again
comparing (38) and (27), it is apparent that under capital controls, with a
fixed value of a(t), the current value of q(t) responds one-for-one with
variations in z(t); whereas in the absence of controls, q(t) depends on
the discounted present value of the current z and all expected future
Z'S. It follows that a temporary, one-period disturbance to z(t) will have
a much stronger effect on q(t) under controls (with a(t) fixed) than In
the absence of capital controls. This is because in the absence of controls38
the capital flow will adjust to accommodate part of the current disturbance
to z(t) and thereby spread the effect of this disturbance over time. More
generally, this principle applies to any form of temporary disturbance to
the z's: capital controls (with a fixed path of a(t)) tend to accentuate
the effects of such disturbances on the real exchange rate.
The other side of the coin is that capital controls reduce the
sensitivity of the real exchange rate to disturbances in the w's, that. is,
to disturbances that affect the desired excess of income over spending.
Looking at (27), it is apparent that disturbances to the w's affect q(t)
in the absence of capital controls because q(t) depends on (t) and (t)
depends on a discounted sum present and expected future values of w. Looking
at (38), however, we find that neither the current w nor any expected future
value of w affects the current value of q(t). Thus, capital controls, with
a fixed value of a(t), insulate q(t) from disturbances to the w's.
There is no necessity, of course, for capital controls to maintain a
fixed value of a(t) in the face of all forms of economic disturbances. In
particular, if a government wanted to stabilize the behavior of' the real
exchange rate (over and above the stability resulting from the absence of
capital controls) it would seek to increase or reduce the value of a(t) in
order to offset positive on negative disturbances to z(t), while holding
a(t) constant in the face of disturbances to the W5,
Aspecial circumstance in which a government may wish to manipulate the
international flow of capital is when it is pursuing other policies in an
effort to affect the real exchange rate.In particular, consider the
unexpected temporary shift of government spending toward domestic goods and
away from domestic goods discussed at the beginning of section 5. Because
private agents anticipate declining values of q subsequent to the impact39
effectof this spending shift, in the absence of capital controlsthere is an
increase the rate of accumulation of net foreign assetsby private agents.
Later on, especially after perood t +Twhen the spending shift ends, the
increase in private net holding of' foreign assets keepsq somewhat higher
than it would otherwise be. But, in period t and in theperiods immediately
following, the increase in private saving diminishes the effect of the
spending shift in raising the relative price of domestic goods.If the
government wished to maximize the impact effect of the spending shift in
raising q(t), it would limit the extent of the capital outflow (purchase of
foreign assets by domestic residents) in order to bottleup the effect of the
spending shift toward domestic goods. A similar capital controls policy would
also be pursued by a government that wished to maximize theimpact effect on
the real exchange rate of the unexpected temporary fiscalexpansion discussed
at the end of section 5.
Much of this analysis of capital controls carries over to theanalysis of
dual exchange rate systems in which governments maintainseparate nominal
exchange rates for current account transactions and for capital account
transactions. (See Dornbusch (198L) and the references cited therein foran
analysis of such systems.) The, usual arrangement in such systems is that the
current account rate is fixed or determined by a crawlingpeg while the
capital account rate is allowed to be determined by market forces, The
effect, indeed the purpose, of such a system is to control the extent of
private international capital flows, with the differential between the capital
account and the current account exchange rates measuring the effective
rationing price of whatever net amount of foreign exchange is allowed to
become available to finance private capital flows.40
7. The Combined Effects of Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy
An especially important mechanism through which economic policies affect
the real exchange rate and thereby replicate some of the effects of commercial
policies is through the interaction of monetary policies and policies directed
at influencing the nominal exchange rate. To analyze the implications of this
combination of policies, it is necessary to broaden the model of earlier
sections by introducing appropriate monetary elements. The condition for
equilibrium in the domestic money market is expressed by the requirement
(40) m k +p*+e+.zq—.De(e)
where m denotes the logarithm of the nominal money supply, k summarizes
the exogenous factors affecting the logarithm of the demand for domestic
money, e denotes the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate (defined as the
price of a unit of world money in terms of domestic money), p denotes the
logarithm of the world money price of traded goods,9. >0is the elasticity
of money demand with respect to the relative price of domestic goods, and
> 0is the semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to the expected
rate of change of the nominal exchange rate. The unitary coefficients on
p and e in (40) are justified by the assumption that the demand for
domestic money is unit elastic with respect to the general level of domestic
prices. The positive coefficient of q in (40) reflects the effect of
increases in q in increasing demand for domestic money both by increasing
the general level of domestic prices (given p* and e) and by increasing
the real value of domestic output measured in terms of traded goods. The
negative coefficient of De(e) in (40) reflects the negative effect on
domestic money demand of an increase in the domestic nominal interest rate
which will result from an increase in the expected rate of depreciation of the
foreign exchange value of domestic money.41
1hen the nominal exchange rate is freely flexible and whengoods prices
adjust instantaneously to maintain equilibrium in the goods markets,monetary
policy exerts no influence on the real exchange rate, q, or onany other
variable in the real sector of the economy. (See Mussa (1984) for further
discussion.) This conclusion is based on the assumption that the behavioral
equations and equilibrium conditions for the real sector of theeconomy that
were described and analyzed in preceding sections of thispaper require no
modifications to accommodate the condition of domesticmoney market equi-
librium given in (40). Specifically, this means that we abstract fromany
real balance effect through which the real value of domesticmoney balances
might affect the desired excess of domestic real spending over domestic real
income. We also assume that under a freely flexible exchangerate, the real
sector of the economy is not affected by the fiscal effects ofmoney creation
and destruction. The revenue that the government derives frommoney creation
is redistributed to the private sector through lump sum transfers. The
private sector uses these transfers to pay the inflation tax on their real
money balances that results from domestic money creation under a flexible
exchange rate. Private sector spending on domestic and foreign goods,
therefore, is assumed to be unaffected by the fiscal effects ofmoney creation
under a flexible exchange rate.
Given the conclusion that the real sector of theeconomy is not affected
by monetary policy under a flexible exchange rate, the money market
equilibrium condition (10) may be used to determine the behavior of the
nominal exchange rate, treating the behavior of themoney supply and of the
determinants of money demand as exogenous. Specifically, treating (40)as a
forward looking difference equation in the expected level of e (andruling
out "bubbles" in the solution) it follows thatL2
(141) E(e(s);t) (1 - xE{m(s +j)K(s+ j);t]
jO
where /(1 +)andK(u) k(u) +p*(u)÷9.q(u).This result, which
is familiar from monetary models of exchange rate determination (see Mussa
1976, 1982a, 1982b, or 19814), says that the logarithm of the expected nominal
exchange rate is a discounted sum of expected present and future differences
between the logarithm of the nominal money supply and the logarithm of the
component of money demand that does not depend on the exchange rate. Included
in this component of money demand is the influence of the behavior of the
logarithm of the relative price of domestic goods, which is determined
independently of the behavior of the domestic money supply;
The real exchange rate and other real sector variables are not influenced
by the behavior of' the money supply or the nominal exchange rate under a
flexible exchange rate regime because under this regime the nominal exchange
rate always adjusts to offset variations in the money supply and preserve
monetary neutrality. This neutrality breaks down, even in the absence of real
balance effects or nominal price stickynss, when the exchange rate is not
freely flexible. To see why this is so and how monetary policy and nominal
exchange rate policy may interact to influence the real exchange rate, it is
useful to consider the specific case where (the logarithm of) the money supply
is held constant at ñiand(the logarithm of) the nominal exchange rate is
pegged at e. Similar analysis applies to the case where the rate of growth
of the money supply is held constant and the rate of change of the nominal
exchange rate is fixed by some predetePmined rate of crawl.
With e pegged at e and m fixed at r, and assuming that no change
in the nominal exchange rate is expected by private agents (so that De(e)
0), the only variable that is free to adjust to satisfy the money market43
equilibrium (40) is (the logarithm of) the real exchange rate.Specifically,
the value of q that is consistent with (140) isgiven by
(42) q(1/)[t -— p* Ic]
This relationship indicates that for given value of kand p, the greater
is the greater is the level of q required to maintainmoney market
equilibrium, and the greater is the lower is the level of q required to
maintain money market equilibrium. It follows that witha pegged exchange
rate, the real exchange rate is not independent of thepolicy determined level
of the money supply, and with a policy determinedlevel of the money supply,
the real exchange rate is not independent of thepolicy determined value of
the nominal exchange rate.
To maintain e at and simultaneously keep m at the government
of the home country will generally need to intervenein the foreign exchange
market and sterilize the effects of such interventionson the domestic money
supply. Analytically, it is simplest to deal with such sterilized
intervention by assuming that the governmentkeeps the domestic credit
component of the money supply constant and financesnecessary interventions in
the foreign exchange market by borrowing andlending on the world capital
market. The required extent of government borrowing is determiredby the
balance of payments equilibrium condition
* e (43) u(z -q)+r(A -G)w -aaD(q) -- g
where G represents the outstanding stock ofgovernment debt and g
represents the flow of government borrowing to finance intervention,Interest
in G is assumed to be financed by lump sum taxes.)44
The flow of government intervention is represented by the same
variable, g, as was previously used to denote the excess of government
spending over government revenue. This is appropriate because when the
government borrows in the world capital market to finance its foreign exchange
intervention, it is necessarily financing an excess of spending over
revenue. This is the fiscal effect of sterilized intervention in the foreign
exchange market. Specifically, if government spending on goods and services
is constant (as will be assumed throughout this discussion), then there must
be a reduction in lump sum taxes to correspond to government borrowing to
finance intervention in the support of the foreign exchange value of domestic
money, and there must be an increase in lump sum taxes to correspond to
government lending (or repayment of past borrowings) that occurs when the
government intervenes to prevent appreciation of the foreign exchange value of
domestic money.
The fiscal effect of foreign exchange market intervention has important
implications for the spending behavior of the private sector. In a situation
where the government must intervene to support the foreign exchange value of
domestic money, the domestic money market is in Tquasi_equilibrium! in the
sense that the current demand for the stock of domestic money is equal to the
current supply but domestic money holders wish to run down their money balance
over time. This running down of money balances over time implies an incipient
excess of private sector spending over private sector income that is planned
to be financed at the expense of money holdings, without any effect on the
rate of change of net foreign asset holdings of the private sector. Under a
flexible exchange rate, this incipient excess of private spending over private
income financed out of money balances would not emerge because the exchange
rate would adjust to the level at which the stock of money is willingly held145
and the planned rate of money accumulationcorresponds to the expected rate of
monetary expansion (both of which are zero when m is held constant at ri).
When the exchange rate is pegged at a value that necessitatesintervention in
support of the foreign exchange value of domestic money, the incipientexcess
of private sector spending over incomecorresponding to the planned rate of
reduction in money balances is offset by the reduction inlump sum taxes
associated with the fiscal effect of government intervention inthe foreign
exchange market. This must be so because with sterilizedintervention, the
actual level of domestic money balances does notdecline, implying that the
private sector does not succeed in spending in excess of its actualincome
(taking account of reduced lump sum taxes) at theexpense of its money
balances. The actual excess of private sectorspending over private sector
income, therefore, corresponds to the desired rate of decumulation ofprivate
net holdings of foreign assets, -D(A) -waa.De(q) + whichis
determined by exactly the same factors as in theanalysis of earlier sections
of this paper.
It should be emphasized that this analysis of interactionbetween private
sector spending behavior and the fiscal effect of sterilizedintervention in
the foreign exchange market does not rely on a traditionalreal balance effect
in which the level of real money balances influences the desiredlevel of
private spending. With a given nominal money supply, incipient differences
between spending and income that the private sectorplans to finance out of
money balances arise only when the government pegs the nominal exchange rate
at a value different from that which would prevail withexchange rate
flexibility.
It should also be emphasized that this analysis of theinteraction
between private sector spending behavior and the fiscal effectof sterilized)46
interventiondoes rely on an assumed failure of the private sector to foresee
the effect of current government borrowing and lending (carried out in support
of foreign exchange market intervention) on future tax liabilities of' the
private sector. If there were a full Ricardian offset private sector saving
for government borrowing, there would be no mechanism through which the flow
to government borrowing or the stock of government debt would influence the
real sector of the economy. It follows that there would be no way (at least
in the context of the present model) for a policy of sterilized intervention
to maintain the real exchange rate at the level determined by (42) if the
pegged value of the nominal exchange rate differs from the nominal exchange
rate that would prevail under exchange rate flexibility. (In a portfolio
balance model where asset holders have distinct demands for securities
denominated in different national monies, however, there is some latitude for
sterilized intervention to affect the exchange rate; see for example, Kenen
(1981) and Henderson (198)4).)
Assuming that the conditions for the fiscal effect of sterilized
intervention to influence the real exchange rate are satisfied, the behavior
of the real exchange rate becomes sensitive to monetary policy and exchange
rate policy. Specifically, a fixed nominal money supply, ,anda fixed
nominal exchange rate, e, maintained by a policy of sterilized intervention,
determine the level of the real exchange rate through the relationship (L2).
Given this value of the real exchange rate, the balance of payments
equilibrium condition (43) determines the extent of official intervention
(financed by government borrowing in the world capital market) that is
required to maintain this value of the real exchange rate;
e
(4)4) g zr*G—(r*+ii)A-aaD(q) +w
- e +(/)[m—e-p-K ÷ D(e)j47
Recognizing that D(G)g, and assuming that no change is expected in the
nominal exchange rate or in the real exchange rate, it follows that the
dynamic law governing the evolution of the stock of government debt is given
by
(145) D(G) zr*.G—(r*p).A ÷ w —vz+('/z)[ —- p—k].
The dynamic law governing the evolution of the stock of privately held foreign
assets (again assuming no expected change in q) is given by
(146) D(A)w —
Together,(45) and (46) constitute the dynamic system that determines the
joint evolution of' G and A with fixed money supply and a pegged nominal
exchange rate, under the assumption that no change is expected in either the
nominal or the real exchange rate.
This dynamic system has two characteristic roots: a stable
characteristic root A1 —.iK0, and an unstable characteristic root
A2r*. The stable characteristic root is associated with the dynamic
process that governs the evolution of the private stock of net foreign
assets. With a fixed value of the forcing variable w which measures
exogenous influences on private sector desired saving, the stock of' privately
held foreign assets necessarily converges to a long run equilibrium level of
wILL. The unstable characteristic root is associated with the dynamic process
governing the evolution of the stock of government debt. With fixed values of
the forcing variables w, z, p* and k and the policy variables
ff1and ,thereis for each initial stock of private net foreign assets a
unique initial stock of government debt for which the subsequent stock of
government debt converges to a finite steady state level. Specifically, if48
A is initially at its long run equilibrium level w/i, the stock of
government debt must be
(147) (w/p) +(v/r*)[z-qJ
where q is given by (42). At this level of G, and only at this level of
G, will the flow of government intervention required to maintain the pegged
nominal exchange rate and the fixed nominal money supply be zero, implying
that the outstanding stock of government debt will not be changing. If G is
> (with AwiLl), the required flow of intervention will be positive,
implying an explosively expanding stock of government debt. If G is <
(with Aw/p), the required flow of intervention will be negative, implying
an explosively contracting stock of government debt (or expanding stock of
government lending).
This dynamic instability in the behavior of the stock of government debt
applies for any assumed behavior of the exogenous forcing variables. It
reflects the fundamental economic instability of a policy that seeks to
maintain a constant nominal exchange rate and a constant nominalmoney stock
by means of sterilized intervention. For any path of the exogenous forcing
variables z, w, p* and k, and for any policy determined value ofrn,
there is only one fixed value of which can be sustained by sterilized
intervention (with a finite bound on government borrowing and lending).In
general, therefore, a policy of fixing the nominal money supply and pegging
the nominal exchange rate is not viable and cannot permanently sustainan
arbitrary value of the real exchange rate.
Rationality of expectations presumably implies that private agents
recognize the long-run nonviability of a policy that fixes the nominal money
supply and pegs the nominal exchange rate. If intervention is persistently49
required to support the foreign exchange value of domestic money, private
agents will suspect that at some point the money supply will need to be
contracted or domestic money will need to be devalued (an increase in
). Conversely, if intervention is persistently required to prevent
appreciation of the foreign exchange value of domestic money, private agents
will suspect either a money supply Increase or an exchange rate appreciation
(a reduction in ). For purposes of' the present discussion which deals with
the real exchange rate, it is useful to focus on the case of persistent
intervention in support of the foreign exchange value of domesticmoney, where
adjustment is expected to come through a nominal exchange rate devaluation (an
increase in ). This has been a common pattern of economic policy in a
number of developing countries.
There are several possible ways to model expectations of a devaluation,
each of which will yield somewhat different implications. The approach
adopted here will be to assume that expectations of a devaluation are related
to the cumulative extent of past intervention in support of the current
nominal exchange rate. Specifically, assuming that G was zero when the
current exchange rate was established, suppose that G must reach some
critical level G before private agents begin to expect any significant
probability of a parity change in the near future. This implies that DC(e)
o so long as G is K G. It follows that so long as C isK G, q will
be determined by (42). Thus, so long as cumulative intervention in support of'
the current nominal exchange rate remains below the critical level G, the
real exchange rate will be at the level dictated by money market equilibrium
for the policy determined values of ñiand . Under this assumption about
expectations of devaluation, therefore, the combination of monetary policy and50
nominal exchange rate policy has the capacity to influence the real exchange
rate, at least over some finite time period.
When G rises above G, the expected rate of devaluation is assumed to
be given by
(8) De(e) p.(G -G).
The factor p reflects both the expected probability of devaluation (during
the next brief interval of time) and the expected extent of devaluation if a
parity change occurs (during this brief interval). Given this assumption
about De(e), it follows that the level of q consistent with money market
equilibrium is still given by (142) when G <G,while when G is >G,the
level of q is given by
(9) q (1/)[ -- p*-k÷p.(G-G)].
When G <G,the expected rate of change of q, De(q), is zero. When
G >G,the expected rate of change of q is given by
(50) 0e(q) €(G G) +(p/Z)D(G)
where (1 +1)-p/9. > 0and where D(G)g is the flow of intervention
when no devaluation takes place. This result reflects the assumption that if
a devaluation occurs during the next brief interval of time, the expectation
of a further devaluation during the following brief interval of time falls to
zero.
With these assumptions, it follows that during the period between
devaluations, when G is <G,q is constant at the level q determined by
(142) and the evolution of A and G are determined by the dynamic system
consisting of (145) and (L6). The comments previously made about this dynamic51
system continue to apply, except that now we are focusing on the case where
intervention tends to be in support of the foreign exchange value of' domestic
money and where G is generally growing over time. When G reaches G and
before devaluation actually occurs, q is determined by (149) and the
evolution of A and G are determined by the dynamic system
(51) D(A)w -iA ÷ - G)-(ap/)•D(G)
D(G)r*.G —(r*+i).A+w—vz+czcic•(G — G)—(aap/9).D(G)
(52)
+(u/Z)[ -p*-k+p(G-C)].
This dynamic system has one negative characteristic root, >- i,and
one positive characteristic root, X2 >r.As in the previous case, the
negative root is associated with the process of convergence of' the private
stock of' net foreign assets toward its steady state level and the positive
root is associated with the explosive behavior of the stock of government
debt. The fact that the positive characteristic root is now greater than its
previous value of r indicates that the anticipation of devaluation by
private agents contributes to the explosive tendency of the dynamic system.
The economic explanation of this result is the following. As private agents
come to expect a significant probability of devaluation of the nominal
exchange rate, the domestic nominal interest rate must rise and the demand for'
domestic money declines. To offset this factor tending to reduce the demand
for domestic money and maintain money market equilibrium, q must rise. This
rise in q implies an increase in the flow of intervention required to
maintain the nominal exchange rate and the nominal money supply and sustain
balance of payments equilibrium. This larger flow of intervention accelerates52
the growth of the outstanding stock of government debt and thereby accelerates
the explosive tendency of the dynamic system. In addition, as De(e) rises
due to increases in the assessed probability of devaluation and in the
expected magnitude of devaluation, private agents no longer expect a zero rate
ofchangeof the real exchange rate. Initially, when G is near G, De(q)
is negative because the expected effect of the growth of G (conditional on
no devaluation), (p/j•D(G), outweighs the expected effect of devaluation
(conditional on its occurence), -€(GG). This initial negative value
of De(q) tends to reduce the extent of intervention required to maintain
balance of payments equilibrium and partially offsets the acceleration of the
growth of G induced by the higher level of q. Later, when G grows large
relative to G, De(q) will become positive and thus become an additional
factor contributing to the explosive tendency of the dynamic system.
The behavior of the real exchange rate and the nominal and real interest
rates in this dynamic process are the following. So long as G remains below
G, q is constant at the level determined by (142) which is above the value
that q would have if the nominal exchange rate was not sustained by
intervention in support of the pegged foreign exchange value of domestic
money. Indeed, returning to the analysis of section 2, the excess of spending
over income that is financed by the fiscal effect of intervention in the
foreign exchange market may be thought of as the proximate cause of the higher
level of q. Since De(e)0and De(q)0 while G remains below G,
the domestic nominal interest rate remains at the level of the world nominal
interestrate,i, and the domestic real interest rate remains at the level
of the world real interest rate, r*. As G rises above G, the level of
q determined by (249)isforced higher and higher by rising assessments of the
probability and likely extent of devaluation, as summarized by the increasing53
value of De(e)p(G -G). De(e) rises the domestic nominal interest
rate rises further and further above the world nominal interest rate. The
domestic real interest rate follows a somewhat different pattern. Initially
when G rises just above G, the expected real domestic interest rate, r
r* -G.De(q),falls below r* because the positive effect of expected growth
in G (conditional on no devaluation) on De(q), (/.)D(G), outweighs the
negative effect associated with the expectation of devaluation, - - G).
Later on, the factor - - G)tending to induce a negative value of
De(q) outweighs the positive factor (p/)D(G) tending to induce a
positive value of De(q) and De(q) becomes negative. At this point the
domestic real interest rate r* —G.De(q)rises above the world real interest
rate r* and it continues to rise until the moment of devaluation.
The general features of this description of the behavior of the real
exchange rate and of the domestic nominal and real interest rates apply under
broader range of assumptions about the conduct of monetary policy and exchange
rate policy. Specifically, consider a policy under which the nominal exchange
rate is depreciated at a predetermined rate of crawl, supplemented by
occasional maxi-devaluations, and the money supply is made to grow at a rate
greater than the growth of the demand for money at the predetermined rate of
crawl of the exchange rate. Suppose that when maxi-devaluations occur under
this general policy regime, they are of sufficient magnitude that for some
time afterward private agents do not expect another maxi-devaluation and,
moreover, the extent of the maxi-devaluation is such that for sometime
afterward there is a balance of payments surplus (on official settlements
basis) which allows the government to repay borrowings used to finance
intervention in support of the exchange rate prior to the last maxi-
devaluation. Under these assumptions, the path of the real exchange rate and of
other relevant variables will be something like the following.54
During the initial period following a maxi-devaluation, while private
agents do not perceive a serious prospect of another immediate rnaxi—
devaluation, the level of q is determined by the money market equilibrium
condition to be
(53) q(1/)[m -e-p*-k]
where rn and e are the policy determined (but not constant) values of the
logarithm of the money supply and logarithm of the price of foreign exchange
and where (for simplicity) p* and k are assumed constant. By assumption,
the rate of growth of the money supply, D(m), is greater than the rate of
crawl of the nominal exchange rate, D(e). Thus, the level of q determined
by (53) will be rising over time at the rate
(54) D(q)(1/)[D(m) -D(e)I.
The extent of the maxi—devaluation is assumed to be such that the level of
q for some period after this maxi-devaluation is consistent with an official




The dynamic behavior of the private stock of net foreign assets during this
period is given by
(56) D(A)w — — (aa/Z)[D(m)—D(e)].Assuming that the increase in q determined by (5L) is correctly anticipated,
the domestic real interest rate, r* —a.De(q),remains below the world real
interest rate during this period.
With the passage of time, the level of q determined by (53) rises
sufficiently that the official settlements balance shifts from surplus to
deficit. The repayment of government debt during the period of surplus,
however, is assumed to restore confidence that there will not be an immediate
maxi—devaluation. Accordingly, the level of q, its rate of change, the
extent of' intervention required to maintain balance of payments equilibrium,
and the rate of change of private net holdings of foreign assets continue to
be determined by (53) through (56). When the cumulative effect of official
settlements deficits pushes government borrowings above the critical level
G at which private agents begin to suspect a significant probability of a
maxi—devaluation, these equations need to be modified along the lines
previously discussed. The rate of increase of q is accelerated by rising
expectations of the probability and likely magnitude of a maxi-devaluation.
The cx ante domestic real interest rate r =r*—G.De(q)initially declines
relative to the value it would have in the absence of anticipations of a maxi—
devaluation, but later r rise.s as G rises significantly above G. The
official settlements deficit and the rate of government borrowing to finance
this deficit rise more rapidly as a consequence of anticipations of a maxi—
devaluation, thereby contributing to the explosive tendency of the dynamic
system.
When the maxi-devaluation occurs, there is a jump up in the nominal price
of foreign exchange (an increase in e) and a jump down in the real exchange
rate (a reduction in q). Subsequently, the just described pattern of
behavior of the real exchange rate, the domestic real interest rate, and the56
officialsettlements balance all repeat themselves until the next maxi
devaluation.
Alternative assumptions about the conduct of monetary policy and exchange
rate policy will yield different conclusions concerning the behavior of the
real exchange rate and other related variables. From the perspective of the
general purpose of this paper, the important general conclusion is that the
combination of a policy that controls the nominal money supply and a policy
that controls the nominal exchange rate, supported by a policy of official
intervention in the foreign exchange market, has some capacity to influence
the behavior of the real exchange rate and other real economic variables.
This capacity arises from two sources. First, the combination of a policy
that controls the nominal money supply and a policy that controls the nominal
exchange rate inevitably influences the behavior of the real value of the
money supply, and the behavior of this real variable should be expected to
influence the behavior of other real variables, including the real exchange
rate. Second, so long as the private sector does not adjust its spending
relative to its income to fully offset debt financed differences between
government spending and government revenue, the fiscal effect of sterilized
intervention in the foreign exchange market will affect the aggregate
difference between spending and income for the economy as a whole, and through
this channel will affect the relative prices which sustain equilibrium in the
goods markets. For this effect to be present, it is not essential that
private agents totally disregard the future tax liabilities implicit in the
current flow of government borrowing. It [s essential that private agents not
reduce their own spending relative to their income to fully offset government
borrowing used to finance intervention in the foreign exchange market. In
order for this effect to be substantial, of course, the flow of borrowing to57
finance intervention must be large, and the offset of private sector spending
in response to government borrowing must not be too great.
8. Conclusion
This paper has developed a general analytical framework that may be used
to analyze how a variety of government policies and other exogenous
disturbances can affect the real exchange rate and thereby influence the
allocation of resources in ways similar to the effects of commercial policy.
Two broad classes of government policies and exogenous disturbances can have
such effects: policies and disturbances that affect the distribution of
domestic spending between domestic goods and foreign (or traded) goods; and
policies and disturbances that affect the level of domestic spending relative
to domestic income. In some cases, the effects of such policies and
disturbances on the real exchange rate and on the allocation of resources may
be quite transparent, as would be the case, for instance, when a government
shifts its own spending from purchasing military equipment in the world arms
market to pursuing domestic development projects that employ primarily
domestic labor.In other cases, the mechanisms through which the real
exchange rate is affected may be more obscure. This may be the case, for
example, with capital controls that depress the relative price of domestic
goods in terms of' foreign goods by limiting the excess of domestic spending
over domestic income that can be financed by an inflow of foreign capital. It
may also be the case with a combined policy of pegging the path of the nominal
exchange rate and fixing the path of the domestic nominal money supply, where
the excess of government spending over government revenue appears under the
guise of reserve losses or foreign official borrowing to support sterilized
intervention in the foreign exchange market.58
The model developed in this paper has essentially the same static
structure as the two basic models that have traditionally been applied in the
theory of international trade and in the analysis of the effects of commercial
policies. These are the standard two-country, two-commodity model summarized
by Mundell (1968, chps. 1-3) and the dependent economy model of Salter (1959)
and Swan (1960). The key innovation of the present analysis is that these
models are made dynamic by taking account both of changes in net foreign asset
positions occuring as a consequence of current account imbalances and of the
effects of changes in net asset positions and of anticipated changes in
relative prices on the relationship between spending and income. This
innovation allows for the analysis of policies and disturbances whose effects
cannot fully be appreciated within the context of a wholly static model. This
is true, for example, of temporary changes in commercial policies or changes
in commercial policies that are anticipated to occur at a future date. It is
also true of temporary or anticipated future changes in either the level or
distribution of government spending, of capital controls, and of nonsus—
tamable policies that fix for some period of time both the path of the
nominal exchange rate and the path of the nominal money supply.
Finally, it is worthwhile emphasizing that the analytical framework
developed in this paper can be applied to a wider set of issues than those
that have been examined here. For example, it is frequently suggested that
some Latin American countries suffered severe economic disturbances in the
late 1970's and early 1980's as a consequence first of a sudden influx of
foreign capital and then from an even more sudden curtailment of capacity to
borrow in the world capital market. This type of disturbnce can easily be
analyzed in the framework developed in this paper by specifying an appropriate
path for the actual and expected evolution of the exogenous forcing59
variable, w, that influences the difference between income and spending.
The influx of foreign capital would be represented by a downward shift in the
actual and expected future values of w. This implies an increase in the real
exchange rate (the relative price of domestic goods in terms of foreign goods)
and a current account deficit which is financed by the inflow of foreign
capital. The sudden, unanticipated curtailment of access to foreign credit
corresponds to an upward shift in the actual and expected future value of w
to above the level it had prior to the influx of foreign credit. This induces
a decline in the real exchange rate to below its level prior to the influx of
foreign credit and an improvement in the trade balance of sufficient magnitude
to allow the country to pay the interest on its expanded stock of foreign
debt. From the analysis carried out in this paper, it follows that a policy
which limits international capital flows would reduce the sensitivity of the
real exchange rate to this type of disturbance. The present framework is
capable of anlayzing any other form of disturbance that can be described as an
alteration in the actual and expected time paths of either the exogenous
variable that affects the desired distribution of spending or the exogenous
variable that affects the relationship between spending and income.60
Michael Mussa
References
Barro, Robert. 19714.Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political
Economy 82 (November/December): 1095—1117.
Bhagwati, Jagdish N. 1968. The theory and practice of commercial policy:
departures from unified exchange rates. Special Papers in International
Economics, No. 8, International Finance Section, Princeton University.
Blanchard, Olivier.19814. Debt, deficits and finite horizons. Unpublished
manuscript, Department of Economics, MIT.
Buiter, Willem and Miller, Marcus. 1983. Real exchange rate overshooting and
the cost of bringing down inflation. In Exchange Rates and International
Macroeconomics, ed. J.A. Frenkel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
pp. 317-58.
Calvo, Guillermo and Rodriquez, Carlos. 1977. A model of exchange rate
determination under currency substitution and rational expectations.
Journal of Political Economy 85 (June): 617-25.
Corden, W. Max.1960. The geometric representation of policies to attain
external and internal balance. Review of Economic Studies 28 (February): 1-22.
_________1967.The exchange rate system and the taxation of' trade. In
Thailand: Social and Economic Studies in Development, ed. T.H. Silcock.
Canberra: Australian National University Press.
_________1971.The Theory of Protection. London: Oxford University Press.
Dornbusch, Rudiger.1975. Alternative price stabilization rules and the
effects of exchange rate changes. Manchester School of Economic and Social
Studies 143 (September): 275-92.
_________1976.Expectations and exchange rate dynamics. Journal of
Political Economy 814 (November/December): 1161—76.61
__________•1980.Open Economy Macroeconomics. New York: Basic Books.
__________•1983.Real interest rates, home goods and optimal external
borrowing. Journal of Political Economy 91 (February):1)41-53.
_________198)4.Exotic exchange rate arrangements. Paper presented to the
MBER/World Bank Conference on Structural Adjustment and the Real Exchange
Rate in Developing Countries. Washington, D.C., Nov. 29 -Dec.1.
Dornbusch, Rudiger and Fischer, Stanley. 1980. Exchange rates and the
current account. American Economic Review 70 (December): 960—71.
Frenkel, Jacob A. and Razin, Asaf.19814.Fiscal policies in the world
economy. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Economics, University of
Chicago.
Harberger, Arnold C.1950. Currency depreciation, income and the balance of
payments. Journal of Political Economy 58 (February): 47-60.
Henderson, Dale W. 198)1.Exchange market intervention operations: their
effects and their role in financial policy. In Exchange Rate Theory and
Policy, eds. J. Bilson and R. Marston. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kenen, Peter B.1981. Effects of intervention and sterilization in the short
run and the long run.In The International Monetary System under Exchange
Rates: Global, Regional and National, ed. R.M. Cooper. Cambridge, Mass.
Ballinger.
Kouri, Pentti.1976. The exchange rate and the balance of payments on the
short run and the long run. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 78 (May):
280-304.
Machlup, Fritz. 1955. Relative prices and aggregate expenditure in the
analysis of devaluation. American Economic Review l5 (June): 255-78.
Meade, James E.1951. The Theory of International Economic Policy, Volume
I: The Balance of Payments. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University
Press.62
Metzler, Lloyd A.1951. wealth, saving and the rate of interest. Journal of
Political Economy 59 (April): 93—116.
Mundell, Robert A. 1960. The public debt, corporate income taxes and the
rate of interest. Journal of Political Economy 68 (December): 622-26.
________1968.International Economics. New York: MacMillan.
Mussa, Michael. 1976. The exchange rate, the balance of payments and
monetary and fiscal policy under a regime of controlled floating.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 78 (May): 229—J48.
__________1977.A dynamic theory of foreign exchange.In Studies in
Modern Economic Analysis: Proceedings of The University Teachers of
Economics, eds. M. Artis and A.R. Nobay. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
_________1979.Macroeconomic interdependence and the exchange rate
regime. In International Economic Policy: Theory and Evidence, eds. R.
Dornbusch and J. Frenkel. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
_________1982a.A model of exchange rate dynamics. Journal of Political
Economy 90 (February): 714_1014.
_________1982b.Exchange rate and price level dynamics in a simple
monetary model.In Exchange Rate Determination and Adjustment, J.S.
Bhandari. New York: Preager.
19814. The theory of exchange rate determination. In Exchange
Rate Theory and Practice, eds. J. Bilson and R. Marston. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Obstfeld, Maurice. 1981a. Macroeconomic policy, exchange rate dynamics and
optimal asset accumulation. Journal of' Political Economy 89 (December):
11)42—61.
_________1981b.Transitory terms of trade shocks and the current
account: the case of constant time preference. International Finance
Discussion Paper No. 1914, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.63
_________1983.Intertemporal price speculation and the optimal current-.
account deficit. Journal of International Monetary Economics 12 (August):
135—45.
Pearce, Ivor F.1961. The problem of the balance of payments. International
Economic Review 2 (February):1-28.
Razin, Asaf and Svennsson, Lars.1983. Trade taxes and the current
account. Economic Letters 13: 55-57.
Salter, W.1959. Internal and external balance: the role of price and
expenditure effects. Economic Record 35 (August): 226—38.
Svennsson, Lars and Razin, Asaf. 1983. The terms of trade and the current
account: the Harberger Laursen—Metzler effect. Journal of Political
Economy 91 (February): 97—175.
Swan, Trevor. 1960. Economic control in a dependent economy. Economic
Record 36 (March): 51-66.
Tsiang, S.c. 1961. The role of money in trade balance stability. American
Economic Review 51 (December): 912-36.